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Abstract 
During long-term refugee displacements, it is common for the refugees’ 
country of origin to be called on to recognize a right of return. A longstanding 
tradition of philosophical theorizing is sceptical of such a right. Howard 
Adelman and Elazar Barkan are contemporary proponents of this view. They 
argue that in many cases it is not feasible for entire refugee populations to 
return home, and so the notion of a right of return is no right at all. We can 
call Adelman and Barkan’s view the feasibility objection. Many defenders of 
rights will deny that empirical facts such of the kind to which Adelman and 
Barkan appeal are relevant to determining whether a moral entitlement 
amounts to a right. In contrast I offer a response to the feasibility objection 
that does admit the relevance of facts. On my view, considerations of 
feasibility do matter to determining what rights human beings possess. 
Nevertheless, the feasibility objection is undone by its failure to acknowledge 
a distinction between two different kinds of feasibility constraints. “Hard” 
constraints include logical, nomological and biological considerations. “Soft” 
constraints include political, cultural and institutional factors. A necessary 
condition of a moral entitlement achieving the status of a right, I argue, is that 
it be feasible in the hard sense. Crucially, however, a right need not always be 
feasible in the soft sense. Refugees can have rights that it is not currently 
possible to implement politically.  
 
Introduction 
Intractable political conflicts can see refugees displaced for extraordinarily 
long periods. During such displacements, it is common for the refugees’ 
country of origin to be called on to recognize a right of return. Typical in this 
regard is the situation of Sahrawi refugees, who for decades have occupied 
remote desert camps in Algeria. Tent cities first rose from the dunes to house 
them in 1975 after they were displaced from Western Sahara as a result of 
military occupation by Morocco. A widespread view among non-government 
organizations (NGOs) supporting the Sahrawi is that they “have a legitimate 
right of return home to a free Western Sahara” (Norwegian Support 
Committee for Western Sahara 2008) The refugees have been in exile for so 
long that the right being affirmed is not simply the generic right everyone has 
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to return to their state of origin. Long-term refugee populations include 
children or even grandchildren who were not born at the time of 
displacement. The right of return therefore includes the right of many 
refugees to “return” to a country they have never previously stepped foot in. 
Thus while the right of refugee return may seem to overlap with the generic 
right to return to one’s country of origin in the case of first-generation 
refugees, because it is meant to be exercised by members of subsequent 
refugee generations, it effectively amounts to a different right.1 It is the right 
of return in this sense, one that pertains to refugees rather than citizens, that is 
commonly put forward by refugees and their advocates as the solution to 
multigenerational exile as is has been experienced by Sahrawi, Palestinian, 
Lhotshampa and other long-term refugee populations (Adelman and Barkan 
2011). 
Despite the frequency with which calls to implement a right of refugee 
return (hereinafter, a right of return) have resonated in international crisis 
zones, philosophers have devoted little attention to analyzing such a right. On 
those occasions when philosophers have taken up the right of return their 
conclusions have often been negative (Arendt 2004: 369-84; Carmi 2005; 
Walzer 1983: 48-51). Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan are contemporary 
proponents of this skeptical view. They argue that in many cases it is not 
feasible for entire refugee populations to return home, and so the notion of a 
right of return is no right at all.  
                                                
1 An important issue concerns whether or under what conditions a right of return ceases to be 
passed on to the descendant of refugees. I argue elsewhere that so long as the descendants of 
refugees occupy a condition of statelessness, as by, for example, occupying a refugee camp, 
they too will possess a right of return (Lamey forthcoming) 
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We can call Adelman and Barkan’s view the feasibility objection. One 
response might be simply to dismiss it. An influential view in political 
philosophy holds that rights and other principles of justice do not include 
matters of fact among the grounds of their justification (Cohen 2008: 229-73). 
On this view it is a mistake to think that any sort of fact about a right, 
including the recurring historic failure to implement it, are grounds to deny 
that it is in fact a right. Even proponents of rights who do not endorse such a 
“fact free” view of their justification may wonder if the feasibility objection is 
well made. We do not normally think that the fact that many people are 
murdered, for example, is grounds to reject a right not to be murdered. So 
why think that historical failures to return invalidate return as a right?  
I offer a critical response to the feasibility objection that does admit the 
relevance of facts. On my view, considerations of feasibility do matter to 
determining what rights human beings possess. Nevertheless, the feasibility 
objection is undone by its failure to acknowledge a distinction found in the 
political feasibility literature, between two different kinds of feasibility 
constraints. “Hard” constraints include logical, nomological and biological 
considerations. “Soft” constraints include political, cultural and institutional 
factors. A necessary condition of a moral entitlement achieving the status of a 
right, I argue, is that it be feasible in the hard sense. Crucially, however, a 
right need not always be feasible in the soft sense. We can have rights that it is 
not currently possible to implement politically.  
When this distinction is noted, it becomes clear that Adelman and Barkan 
are concerned with soft feasibility constraints on the right of return. While 
such constraints may prevent a right from functioning as an end to aim at, 
they do not prevent a right from functioning as a standard. Applied to a right 
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of return, such a standard-right can have bearing on situations even where it 
is not possible to implement return as an end. In particular, a right of return 
understood as a standard can be used to determine which among a set of 
feasible options should be adopted as an aim. A right of return so understood 
can also be used to guide the reform and development of future political 
institutions. It can serve as a moral principle that directs us toward new 
structures that respect the right of refugees to voluntarily return home. Given 
these possibilities, even if we accept for the sake of argument all of the 
feasibility constraints cited by proponents of the feasibility objection, this does 
not gainsay the status of return as a genuine right.  
In what follows I do not mount any positive defence or outline of a right of 
return or its basis, a task I have taken up elsewhere (Lamey: forthcoming). 
Nor do I deny that in practice outcomes other than return will sometimes be 
the most prudent to pursue (Long 2013). We can have rights that it is not 
currently possible to exercise. Instead I try to show why a right of return, 
whatever its nature and foundation prove to be, is not undone by the fact that 
return so often remains for refugees an unfulfilled dream.  
The Feasibility Argument Against the Right of Return 
Adelman and Barkan take over and adapt an argument originally put 
forward by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, which contains a 
long chapter discussing the treatment of European refugees during the first 
half of the 20th century. Arendt argued that once someone had lost the rights 
that come with being a citizen of a state that person was consigned to a 
position of rightlessness. This is the condition she took refugees to embody, a 
condition that ringing declarations of human rights did nothing to alleviate. 
In Arendt’s view, rights are only real if they are enforceable, and a refugee 
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has lost the protection of the law of her country. A person in that situation has 
no meaningful rights to speak of, Arendt concluded. Hence her bitter and 
pessimistic conclusion that “the loss of national rights in all instances entail 
the loss of human rights,” and that the concept of human rights itself “broke 
down” when human rights advocates were confronted for the first time with 
refugees as a mass phenomena (Arendt 2004: 380).  
Arendt made her argument in 1951, the same year the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees was signed. One possible response to her argument 
thus might be to suggest that her empirical claim that the rights or refugees 
are systematically violated is no longer true. Adelman and Barkan however 
present extensive empirical evidence to support the view that a certain 
category of refugee is today commonly unable to exercise a right of return. 
These are refugees who are ethnic minorities in the country of return. When 
such refugees are displaced by conflict that has an ethnic component, 
Adelman and Barkan argue, it is common for the animosity that originally 
caused the minority refugees to flee to linger long after the fighting stops, 
making the dominant population unwilling to accept return.  
Adelman and Barkan argue that the inability of minority refugees to 
exercise a right of return is a problem for any account of rights that takes 
feasibility as a necessary condition of a moral claim being a full-fledged right, 
whether or not the feasibility mechanism takes the form of national law. 
“Claims for the right of return have weak grounds on the basis of historical 
success, functionality, [the] tradition of civil law . . . or emergent historical 
principles,” they write (Adelman and Barkan 2011: 226). The two authors thus 
conclude that when it comes to the right of return, Arendt’s conclusion 
remains sound. “When the [state] ends, either as a general political reality or 
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as a political reality for the individual, so too do the rights of humans” (2011: 
226).  
As noted above, one possible retort to this critique of the right of return is 
to deny that feasibility is a necessary condition of possessing such a right. On 
this view of rights, the bearer of a right need not have the ability to exercise it. 
A right is rather understood as a purely aspirational notion, and so is 
unscathed by a critique to the effect that its exercise is systematically 
unfeasible. Adelman and Barkan however reply that this view is too toothless 
to count as a full-fledged “right”: 
There is no sanction attached or even any built-in measure to 
demand, let alone ensure, compliance. It s merely a claim with no 
correlative principle of delivery, akin to an assertion that everyone 
has the right to be loved but with no duty imposed on another 
party for delivering that love. Rights as claims end up providing a 
universal ground but virtually no implementation conditions. 
When extended to the right of return, such a sense of rights 
undermines a much thicker and richer sense of rights. Though it is 
true that all rights are claims, rights seem not to be reducible to 
claims. If that is the sense of a right of return, it might be best to 
not to dub it a right except in a metaphorical sense where it is 
simply one claim among many others (2011: 234). 
 
In other words, in order for a moral claim to achieve the status of a right, it 
must be accompanied by a measure to ensure compliance. The frequency with 
which minority refugees are unable to return home suggests that there is no 
effective measure that will allow them to do so, thereby gainsaying refugee 
return as a genuine right.  
Adelman and Barkan present empirical evidence documenting the 
frequency with which NGOs and refugees themselves appeal to a right of 
return in advocating for the resolution of refugee crises around the world. 
They suggest that the right of return has become the default claim of refugees 
and their advocates internationally. Despite the frequency with which such 
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calls are issued, there is something inauthentic about the right of return, they 
conclude, which should not occupy any place of prominence in solving 
refugee crises. Instead refugees and their advocates should be more open to 
alternative solutions to mass displacement, such as integration in the country 
of exile or resettlement to a third country. The moral and political prestige 
that currently attaches to a right of return only has the negative effect of 
prolonging the exile or refugees who could otherwise seek more effective 
solutions. 
Wide vs. Narrow Feasibility Objections 
It is helpful in responding to Adelman and Barkan’s version of the 
feasibility objection to distinguish what their narrow version of the objection 
from the wider variation pressed by Arendt. Arendt’s argument was a 
challenge to any right refugees might be said to possess. Her analysis was 
meant to show that such rights are merely “supposed.” (2004: 372). Such a 
claim does not merely highlight the political challenge of legally enforcing 
rights, but questions the very notion of rights that adhere at the level of 
humanity (as opposed to citizenship).  
Such a conclusion however is counter-intuitive. Insofar as rights are not 
merely legal concepts but moral ones, it is not clear why the loss of legal 
protection would entail one’s loss of standing as a bearer of moral rights. 
Compared to Arendt, Adelman and Barkan’s argument is more focused. It 
singles out the right of return, in particular, as unfeasible and so not a 
genuine right. It is less ambitious in a second way, in that it does not seek to 
show that feasibility concerns rule out the notion of a right understood as a 
purely moral claim, divorced from any type of enforcement mechanism. 
While allowing that a purely moral understanding of a right of return is 
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conceptually possible, they question the value of a non-enforceable right of 
return through their comparison to a right to be loved, arguing that such a 
right is ineffective to the point of being an empty platitude. 
Criticism 
I accept for the sake of argument that the contemporary refugee situation is 
a grim as Adelman and Barkan make out. My concern is not with the 
empirical but rather the theoretical aspect of their account. To begin with, 
their parallel to a right to be loved seems overdrawn. A duty to love a 
particular person would require the duty-bearer to have a particular 
emotional reaction. Attempting to force someone to uphold such a duty 
would seem to generate a paradox. To the degree that coercion is required to 
uphold a duty of love, love itself will not be the result, as love must be freely 
given to be genuine. We thus encounter a variation of the endorsement 
constrain referred to by Ronald Dworkin, which holds that it is pointless to 
coerce individuals to uphold the tenets of a religion they do not believe in, as 
coercion can generate only the outward signs of belief, rather than belief itself 
(Kymlicka 2001: 216). 
In the case of a right of return, by contrast, coercion could be an entirely 
effective means of implementation. In such cases no emotional reaction or 
inner attitude needs be generated. Rather unwilling parties need only be 
coerced to the extent that they not prevent a journey of return. Thus the same 
paradoxical outcome of having to coerce someone into having an emotional 
reaction that must be uncoerced to be authentic does not seem to apply. 
In the case of a right of return it also seems possible to identify entities with 
a correlative duty to seek to bring about return: they would include the 
government of the country of return, international organizations such as the 
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United Nations, European Union and African Union, and human rights and 
refugee Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). Historically, these are the 
three types of entities, governments, international bodies and NGOs, that 
have worked toward, and sometimes actually brought about, refugee returns. 
To what degree each type may be an effective implementer of a right will of 
course vary from situation to situation. If a government was the original agent 
of displacement, for example, we can legitimately wonder how soon 
thereafter it will recognize a right of return. On the other hand, if the 
government changes, or merely tolerated rather than instigated displacement, 
it could conceivably accept return.  
Adelman and Barkan, in sum, fail to acknowledge that a right of return can 
be upheld through coercion, and can be the subject of duties borne by 
governments, international bodies and NGOs. In both these ways, the right of 
return amounts to more than just a free-floating moral claim. It is rather a 
right that can in principle be enforced. But if the possibility of enforcement 
makes the right of a return a genuine right, where this means more than a 
disembodied moral claim, it is necessary to be maximally clear on the 
relationship between feasibility and rights. Do rights require any kind of 
feasibility and if so in what way? Are rights more than aspirational notions, 
and if so how? Let us now turn to an account of rights that seeks to answer 
these questions.    
Two Functions of Rights: End vs. Standard 
Rights are tools to both bring about, and to think about, justice. Although 
rights often play both these roles at the same time they are not quite identical. 
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To see the difference it is helpful to distinguish between a right’s function as 
an end and its function as a standard.2 
A right is an aim when it is a goal to be implemented. When we read about 
human rights causes or campaigns—improving prison conditions, publicizing 
the mistreatment of migrant workers, launching a lawsuit to legalize gay 
marriage—the right in question is functioning as an aim. In this capacity 
rights denote a basic political minimum to which all citizens or human beings 
are entitled, an entitlement that rights groups, legislatures and courts 
variously seek to implement.  
Separate from this is a right’s ability to provide a standard of justice. In this 
capacity it offers a basis of judgement. Much of the time, a right serves as both 
a standard and an aim. Indeed, its function as an aim presupposes that it has 
first been taken as a standard. Important to note however it is that it is 
possible for a right to provide a standard even when it does not function as an 
aim.   
Consider the example of a right to health care. To possess such a right is to 
be entitled to some basic minimum of medical services and treatment. But 
now suppose there is a hospital with resources too limited to provide all of its 
patients with the basic minimum of care. In such an instance it is not feasible 
for the right to be a hospital-wide aim. It can however still function as a 
standard, by providing a framework under which different options are 
evaluated. Suppose for example a small number of patients suffer from a 
condition that requires an expensive drug to treat, while a larger group of 
                                                
2 This terminology is inspired by a distinction Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum 
make between end-aims and end-standards (2014). Their understanding of the relationship 
between aims and standards differs from mine by not taking into account the considerations 
of feasibility I emphasize below.  
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patients have a disease that is cheaper to cure. Analyzing the two options by 
reference to the right to health care recommends buying the cheaper drug, as 
the right to health care will be upheld on a wider scale. Despite the fact that 
the right to health care cannot function as an aim at the level of the entire 
hospital population, it still plays an important role by serving as a basis by 
which to judge and rank second-best options, choosing whichever comes 
closest to fully satisfying the right in question. 
In the hospital example a lack of feasibility prevents the right from serving 
as an end. It seems obvious that feasibility considerations can practically 
restrain rights in this way. We generally consider it pointless to try to bring 
about outcomes that are not possible. Of course there will be cases in which 
we will not know in advance whether it is feasible to aim at upholding a 
given right. But there are cases in which it is clear that a right has no chance of 
being upheld. In the early 1990s for example the government of Somalia 
collapsed. The right to a fair trail, like other rights dependent on the existence 
of a functioning government, was not possible to implement under such 
circumstances. At least some of the time, rights violations are so entrenched 
that it is reasonable to focus on coming as close as we can to upholding them, 
rather than seeking to bring about the impossible goal of full compliance.  
This view clearly takes feasibility considerations seriously when it comes to 
upholding rights. But what feasibility prevents here is a right functioning as 
an end. In the hospital scenario feasibility constraints do not prevent the right 
to health care from functioning as a standard. Surely the reason is obvious. Just 
because we cannot fully implement a right to health care, it does not follow 
that we should give up upholding such a right even partially. Even in the 
Somalia scenario, we might judge how disputes are adjudicated by a standard 
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of procedural justice based on a right to a fair trail, judging the available 
methods by how much they approximate a fair trial. 
Can feasibility considerations prevent rights from functioning not just as 
an end, but also as a standard? Yes, but in order for this to occur the 
feasibility constraint must be at a higher order of magnitude. Consider the 
example of a right to communicate with one’s dead relatives. This is an 
implausible candidate for right status, and its implausibility is sufficiently 
demonstrated by its impossibility. Rights are normally thought of as in 
principle achievable, which this right is not. It therefore is reasonable to deny 
that there is any right to communicate with the dead, including as a right-
standard. 
There are thus different ways can feasibility constraints can undermine 
rights as aims vs. rights as standards. Feasibility concerns must meet a lower 
threshold of difficulty to stop rights-ends than to stop rights-standards. In 19th 
century Britain it was not considered feasible to have universal suffrage; in 
the 1950s United States it was not considered feasible to elect an African-
American president; and today doubts are expressed over the feasibility of 
countries working together to provide an effective response to climate change. 
Feasibility constrains of this kind involve issues of political possibility which 
can change considerably over time. The unfeasibility of a right to 
communicate with ones’ dead relatives by contrast is due to an unchanging 
biological and ontological fact of the human condition, that of death itself. 
When these two types of infeasibility are not distinguished we risk 
inadvertently proclaiming changeable political constraints as timeliness and 
insurmountable barriers to progress.  
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Following Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, we can term these two 
different types of feasibility constraints hard and soft (2012). Biological, 
physical and logical restraints are examples of hard feasibility constrains. 
They are typically binary: they either rule something out categorically or not 
at all. Cultural, political and social restraints are examples of soft constraints. 
They are typically scalar, in that they admit of degree. Applied to the two 
functions of rights, scalar infeasibility can prevent a right from functioning as 
an end to varying degrees. To the degree that government institutions have 
gradually reclaimed control of Somalia, for example, one feasibility barrier to 
upholding the right to a fair trial will be removed, even if others may remain. 
To the degree that Somalia is an impoverished society, its poverty imposes 
another feasibility constraint on the degree of rights-protection its citizens can 
realistically expect. But as government institutions and poverty are both 
social phenomena, the feasibility barriers in question are categorically 
different from the binary infeasibility death poses to the right to communicate 
with the dead. Nothing in the laws of nature or logic prevent Somalia from 
one day becoming a fully rights-respecting society. Even in its most anarchic 
period, the feasibility barriers to upholding rights in Somalia were scalar 
rather than binary.   
Applied to Adelman and Barkan’s argument, the feasibility consideration 
they cite against the right of return involves a form of soft infeasibility: the 
reluctance of the society of origin to re-admit people it has expelled. The 
underlying barrier to return in such instances is an intolerant and 
unwelcoming attitude toward the expelled. Such an attitude does seem 
sufficient to undermine a right of return as an end. But in order to rule out a 
right of return altogether feasibility considerations would need to rule out 
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such a right as both an end and a standard. And the right of return’s function 
of a standard in a given scenario does not depend on it functioning as an end. 
Like any right it can still have value as a standard, including in situations in 
which it cannot function as a feasible end. 
If return is a right, what value can it have in scenarios in which it cannot be 
implemented? One value it can have is to help determine which of the 
available options is best. Another value is that it can help guide the ongoing 
development of political institutions and norms with an eye to reducing the 
feasibility constraints on return in future instances of displacement. 
To see the first kind of value, consider a refugee scenario in which 
widespread return is not a realistic option. The available options may include 
outcomes that resemble return to a greater or lesser degree. One way they 
may differ for example is in relocating refugees to two different locations, one 
of which was much closer and more similar to their country of origin. 
Alternatively, one option may involve preserving the cultural identity of a 
group of refugees and their cohesiveness as a group, compared to other 
alternatives that involve dividing the group and scattering its members across 
different locations. In both choice situations, even though return is not 
possible, the right of return can be invoked as a standard by which to judge 
the two available options, recommending the one that most closely resembles 
actual return.  
Some might question how valuable this use of a right of return really is. 
Consider the example of Jews expelled from Spain during the Inquisition. 
Might there have been value in them simple getting on with their lives as 
opposed to continuing to think of themselves as Spanish in some way?3 This 
                                                
3 I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.  
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objection however draws a false contrast between continuing to being able to 
function within one’s culture of origin and getting on with one’s life. Consider 
the example of Heinrich Blücher who, like his wife Hannah Arendt, was a 
refugee from Nazi Germany. After the couple found refuge in the United 
States, Arendt thrived as a successful academic. Blücher by contrast 
experienced a decade of melancholy and unemployment. ‘Politically he was 
grateful for his refuge, but socially he was bewildered,’ Arendt’s biographer 
wrote. ’Throughout his first year in America, Blücher was disoriented. 
Learning English was painfully difficult’ (Young-Bruehl 2004: 165). Blücher, 
far from unique, illustrates an all too common outcome for people forced to 
flee their societies of origin. Preserving some ability on the part of refugees to 
function in their culture of origin will in many cases make it more rather than 
less likely that they will get on with their lives.    
The second value of a right of return is that it can serve as a design 
principle to apply to future political norms and institutions. Adelman and 
Barkan characterize the Dayton Peace Agreement, which marked the end of 
the Bosnian War in 1995, as the first peace treaty to include a right of return 
that was supported by the international community. A right of return could 
serve as a principle by which to outline similar peace agreements in the future. 
Alternatively, there is a view among rights advocates that human rights 
clauses should be written into trade agreements (Douglas et al. 2004; Hafner-
Burton 2009). A right of return could conceivably be included among such 
rights. Or the United Nations might be reorganized so as to give UNHCR 
more resources in dealing with refugee-producing states. Such states might 
alternatively or additionally be subjects of boycott campaigns seeking to 
pressure them to respect a right or return. Finally, the right of return might be 
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promulgated as a norm that should be enforced by the international 
community, similar to how the responsibility to protect, for better of for 
worse, has recently been proposed as such a norm.  
Considerations of this kind are forward looking. As such they are 
unscathed by Adelman and Barkan’s critique, which is backward looking. 
Such considerations show that even if a right of return has not had an 
effective enforcement mechanism to date, this does not rule out the possibility 
of it obtaining some such mechanism in the future. This suggests there is a 
third option in between an effective right with a reliable enforcement 
mechanism and a free-floating claim with no such enforcement mechanism. 
There is also the possibility of a moral claim that compels one to create an 
enforcement mechanism—to make someone subject to a duty of enforcement. 
This impulse is a longstanding one in the history or rights-respecting 
institutions, and it is not undone by considerations of the kind Adelman and 
Barkan cite. For all these reasons, the right of return can have value as a 
standard even when it is not feasible to implement as an end.  
Nevertheless, a critic might still maintain that while there is value in 
applying a rights-based standard to refugee scenarios, the right of return per 
se will not provide this standard. Rather the standard will be provided by the 
underlying normative justifications for a right of return.4 Different proponents 
of a right of return have appealed to different justifications. One view for 
example holds that return is rooted in a right of residency and occupancy in 
the refugee’s country of origin (Halwani 2008; Moore 2015). Another view 
holds that return is justified by a background right to re-occupy the status of 
someone’s whose rights are protected by their state of origin (Lamey 
                                                
4 I owe this objection to Rekha Nath. 
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forthcoming). I have deliberately not taken sides in this debate here in order 
to focus on overcoming the feasibility objection, which is directed at every 
account of a right of return rather than one particular justification. But let us 
imagine for the sake of argument that a right of return is based on a prior 
right to occupy a particular territory of origin. It would be this underlying 
territorial right, not the right of return per se, that would provide the relevant 
standard. Similarly, we might imagine a right of return being an outgrowth of 
a prior right to be part of the refugee’s original political community. Again it 
would be this prior right of belonging that would function as a standard of 
guidance. The right of return, on this objection, will play no role in helping 
decide which available option is best.  
This objection overlooks how a right of return affirms moral claims above 
and beyond the relevant background rights. Whatever the correct background 
rights turn out to be, the right of return makes a separate affirmation about 
the moral status of refugees.  
The Arendtian tradition of theorizing about refugees holds that because 
they are not protected by law, although they may still in some sense deserve 
various moral entitlements, these entitlements lack the importance or priority 
that has traditionally been noted by bestowing them with the status of a right. 
Hence the remark of Adelman and Barkan that when the law ends, so too do 
the rights of humans. Thinkers in the Arendtian tradition thus do not deny 
that human beings in general possess territorial, belonging or other rights. 
What they reject rather is that such rights extend to refugees. Affirming a right 
of return is a rejection of this view. It affirms that refugee status does not 
change a person’s entitlement to the moral goods protected by background 
rights.  
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There are some social roles a person can adopt that can see them lose some 
rights. Soldiers for example lose the right not to be targeted in warfare. The 
right of return affirms that refugee status is not a role that sees its occupant 
lose background rights. A right of return thus goes beyond simply affirming 
the relevant background rights by specifying that coming to occupy refugee 
status is not a defeater for the possession of such rights. Saying that a right of 
return plays no role in serving as a rights-standard in non-return is therefore 
inaccurate, as it is in virtue of possessing a right of return that refugees 
remain bearers of the background right or rights in question.  
Conclusion 
The largest refugee crisis of the second half of the 20th century occurred in 
1971, when over ten million people were displaced from what was then East 
Pakistan to India. Refugees in the Indian town of Basarat were described as 
“so thick on the streets that cars can only inch through. Refugees overflow 
every doorstep, porch and empty building” (Schanberg 1971). When 
Bangladesh gained independence 18 months later, the same people formed 
the largest refugee return in history. Although the sheer number of refugees 
able to return in this case was unique, mass return as such was not. Afghan 
refugees have existed in Pakistan in large numbers since Afghanistan 
experienced a communist coup in 1978. In the years following the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001 millions of refugees, including many who had spent their 
entire lives in Pakistan, moved to Afghanistan. “The three generations of 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan all have slightly different expectations,” one aid 
official involved in the mass relocation observed in 2014. “For the younger 
two generations who choose to repatriate, they have never lived in their own 
country, but they’ve decided that it’s time to try” (James 2014). 
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These cases should be born in mind alongside their more tragic 
counterparts from Western Sahara and elsewhere who are unable to return. 
Although return is sometimes politically impossible it is not necessarily so. 
Return, crucially, has been a reality for millions of refugees. As important as 
the non-ideal reality of refugees is, and as real as the challenges to return can 
be, return ultimately remains within the realm of political possibility. As such, 
the challenges facing a right of return should not be regarded as so strong as 
to disqualify return as a right. And as we have seen, even when return is not 
possible, the right of return can still function as a rights-standard, providing a 
model for how to apply other rights to other situations of non-ideal justice. 
For both these reasons, we should endorse a right of refugee return. Of 
course, to do so is not to say return will always be the best course of action to 
pursue, all things considered. The reality of long-term displacement means 
that there will be cases in which local integration or resettlement is the better 
option compared to holding out for return, which could potentially prolong 
refugees’ misery. Nevertheless, until we live in a world without refugees, 
return will be not only a dream but a right.  
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